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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-M-296  
1 April 1986

Minutes  
Two Hundred and Ninety-second Meeting  
Wednesday 19 March 1986, 1003 - 1201 Hours  
Room 7D32, Headquarters Building

[redacted]  
Chairman  
Presiding

CS RECORD

FILE *ICA/Secom*

*minutes*

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MEMBERS PRESENT

LTC George L. Alvarez, U.S. Marine Corps  
Mr. James Callahan, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force  
Col. Anthony J. Gallo, Jr., Department of the Army  
CAPT William C. Horn, Department of the Navy

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Mr. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice  
Mr. Gary L. Stoops, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALTERNATES PRESENT

Mr. Robert C. Allen, Department of the Navy  
Mr. George Henriksen, Department of the Navy

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Mr. Roger H. Robinson, Department of State  
Mr. Michael S. Smelser, Department of the Treasury  
Mr. Richard F. Williams, Office of the Secretary of Defense

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Thomas W. Chace, Department of State

[redacted] 25X1

Lt. Col. John Reale, Department of the Air Force

[redacted] 25X1

Mr. Frederick H. Bowen, SECOM Staff  
Mr. William B. Hart, SECOM Staff  
Mr. Alan F. Petit, SECOM Staff

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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

A. Introduced [REDACTED] of NSA's Office of General Counsel, and Mr. [REDACTED] of CIA, as first time attendees. [REDACTED] noted that Mr. Dowd, the Department of Energy member, and Mr. Blankenship, his alternate, have been reassigned. He expressed regrets about the departure of these valued associates. [REDACTED]

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E. Stated that the NSDD-196 working group seems to be making little progress in implementing the polygraph provision. [REDACTED] said opposition to polygraph testing by some departments (State, Treasury and Commerce) is contributing to suggested compromises that could fragment the SCI security system. One proposal, he said, was to divide SCI into "sensitive" and "non-sensitive" categories. [REDACTED], who represents NSA on the NSDD-196 working group, had tabled an excellent proposal that the polygraph education program to be given the as yet unconvinced Secretaries of State, Treasury and Commerce include a full presentation on the process. This would address the examination, use of polygraph-derived information, adjudication, sensitivity of intelligence access for which polygraph testing would be required, and selection of candidates for examination in light of the shortage of examiners. [REDACTED] noted other potential problem areas affecting implementation. These include OPM policy regarding examination of persons in the competitive service, and Congressional limits on how many persons DoD can test. [REDACTED]

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F. Noted that SECOM discussions of releases to contractors pursuant to DCID 1/7 included mention of DCI policy on contracting operation of functions that involve broad access to intelligence. [REDACTED] invited attention to copies at members' places of the 16 August 1982 memorandum by the NFIC Executive Secretary enunciating that policy. [REDACTED]

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G. Reported that development of the [REDACTED] is being delayed by technical problems. [REDACTED] noted that the project was begun with [REDACTED] in SECOM "seed money." The engineering model of the receiver is now expected to become available in June 1986, and three prototype models are expected to be delivered in February 1987. FY 1986 funds committed to purchase of these receivers will have to be diverted elsewhere. The FY 1987 budget may be squeezed by Gramm-Rudman or other cuts to the point where it will be difficult to allocate enough funds to buy the needed numbers of this important "tool" in our TSCM inventory. [REDACTED]

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H. Advised that the temporary hold put on Project SLAMMER in the fall of 1985 resulted in loss of FY 1985 funds allocated to it. [REDACTED] said \$20,000 of FY 1986 SECOM funds had been diverted from the leak videotape project to support SLAMMER. He said he hoped to have Major Hibler, SLAMMER project director, brief SECOM at the April or May meeting. [REDACTED]

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I. Requested members to block out the 20-21 October 1986 period for the annual SECOM executive seminar. [REDACTED]

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#### ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes

The minutes of the 12 February 1986 meeting were approved subject to changes requested by Mr. Williams to lines 18-20 of the first full paragraph on page 4. (A copy of the corrected page is provided with these minutes.) [REDACTED]

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#### ITEM 2 Personnel Security

Members discussed informally a variety of subjects pursued in personnel security investigations and how data obtained on those subjects is used in adjudication and clearance actions. Members agreed to discuss these matters further at the 16 April 1986 meeting. [REDACTED]

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ACTION: SECOM members are requested to come to the 16 April 1986 meeting prepared to discuss this subject further. [REDACTED]

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#### ITEM 3 Old Business

A. [REDACTED] noted transmission to members of a revised draft of the proposed personal computer security guidelines. He said the revision takes account of SECOM member comments, and suggestions by Computer Security Subcommittee members and the staff of the DCI Information Handling Committee. He asked if members had any concerns about the revision. [REDACTED] said the second sentence in the first section on page 3 appeared to conflict with DCI guidance in NFIB/NFIC 9.1/47 (Annex F, Item 4, which states that "personally owned electronic equipment shall not be introduced into an SCIF").

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Mr. Robinson commented that that sentence is needed to address an identifiable threat. [ ] asked if the sentence should be left in to address personally owned equipment already in place. He suggested that the sentence be revised to use the present tense. [ ] agreed. The sentence then reads "if such items are in an operational environment...." Mr. Williams observed that some maintenance is performed by escorted but uncleared persons. He asked if the "maintenance" section at the bottom of page 3 should be changed. [ ] replied that such cases are relatively unusual, and said it is best not to include too many exceptions to policy. He then asked if members were in agreement on the guidelines subject to the change noted above. Members indicated that they were. [ ]

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B. [ ] advised of a slight modification to the proposed definition of SCI. He asked if members were in agreement. [ ] requested that the modifier "access" be added before "control" in line 3 of the proposal. In response to a question [ ] said it will not be necessary to submit this definition to other DCI committees. He asked members if they approved the proposed definition with the change requested by [ ]

[ ] Members indicated that they did. The approved definition reads:

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"SCI is classified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods or analytical processes, which is required to be handled exclusively within formal access control systems established by the Director of Central Intelligence."

#### ITEM 4 New Business

A. [ ] invited attention to copies at member's places of an approach to the problem of unauthorized disclosures proposed by [ ] Chairman of the Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee. Mr. [ ] said the proposal is designed to determine which disclosures are authorized and which are not. He advised that he had told former DIRNSA Faurer that this is an idea worth considering. He noted that the November 1984 DCI list of options on the unauthorized disclosure problem sent to the NSC contained a similar proposal. He asked members to review the proposal quickly and provide initial reactions. Mr. Stoops asked if the proposal would require a change to E.O. 12356 regarding effective declassification of information released by proper authority. [ ] replied that that is a good point which requires exploration. He asked members to consider the proposal further and provide comments on it. [ ]

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ACTION: SECOM members are requested to review [ ] proposal on "controlled executive disclosures" and provide the staff their comments. Comments are requested by 2 April 1986 if possible, but no later than the 16 April 1986 SECOM meeting. [ ]

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B. Col. Gallo advised that Mr. Joseph Pell of his staff is retiring after 40 years' government service. He commended Mr. Pell for his faithful performance as Army member of the Personnel Security Subcommittee. [ ]

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C. Lt. Col. Reale reported that the Compartmentation Subcommittee met on 7 March to discuss potential changes to DCID 1/7. He advised that CIA Directorate of Operations personnel were present to address concerns about protection of sensitive sources. He noted that subcommittee members had been tasked to provide suggested changes by 24 March 1986. [ ] 25X1

D. [ ] asked if the polygraph provisions of NSDD-196 should be included in DCID 1/14. [ ] replied that it is necessary first to determine what decisions will be made on NSDD-196 implementation before considering changes to the DCID. [ ] 25X1 25X1 25X1

E. Mr. Williams advised of DoD security concerns about a Congressional request for a list of special access programs. [ ] 25X1

F. Mr. Rubino reported that the Department of Justice is "getting tough" on white collar crime. He advised that there will be more prosecutions involving government contracts, including "black" ones. He noted that a firm under indictment obtained clearances for defense lawyers through the DoD industrial security program. Mr. Rubino said Justice obtained agreement from the judge in this case that such clearances were not appropriate and that the procedures of the Classified Information Procedures Act apply. He noted that 7 law firms are involved in defending General Dynamics; at least 31 persons need to be cleared. He advised that this and similar cases involve potential broad access to very sensitive information. [ ] 25X1

G. CAPT Horn said the Navy wanted the SECOM listing of available security awareness materials updated. [ ] said that should be taken up with the Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee. [ ] 25X1 25X1

#### ITEM 5 Next Meeting

[ ] advised that the next regular meeting will be held at 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, 16 April 1986, in room 7D32, CIA Headquarters. [ ] 25X1 25X1 25X1

[ ]  
Executive Secretary

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